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Response
Andrew Latham
I. Introduction
Let me begin by thanking Dr. Gardiner for coming to Macalester and 
providing us with a thoughtful and thought-provoking critique of the 
United Nations, an institution near and dear to the hearts of many 
members of the Macalester community. One of the hallmarks of a qual-
ity liberal arts education is programming that purposefully exposes 
students to ideas with which they may not be familiar or even comfort-
able; that forces them out of their intellectual comfort zone, to think 
again about what they believe and why they believe it; and that allows 
students to experience the clash of large and consequential ideas. Given 
what I know of the Macalester “common sense” regarding the United 
Nations (not to mention our historical and contemporary attachments 
to that organization), I think it is safe to say that Dr. Gardiner’s essay 
does all of those good things. It certainly challenges many of our col-
lectively held shibboleths about the U.N., and I have to say I have 
never before heard Ambassador Bolton described in quite so glowing 
terms on this campus. In short, I view this essay as a very welcome 
contribution to a potentially difficult dialogue about the future of an 
institution that I’m sure many of us think of as unambiguously good 
and virtuous.
That being said, how should we assess the specifics of the argument 
advanced by Dr. Gardiner? Put simply, I can sum up my evaluation in 
this way: even when judged in terms of its own project (which, as we 
shall see, is largely derivative of the broader neoconservative effort to 
renew American hegemony), his proposals must ultimately be found 
to be either irrelevant or counterproductive. More specifically, I will 
argue that Gardiner’s argument is premised on a deeply flawed under-
standing of “power” that equates the possession of material resources 
(weapons, money, etc.) with influence (the capacity to realize its goal, 
even in the face of opposition from others). Second, I will argue that his 
argument depends on a conceptualization of international hegemony 
that is similarly misguided by positing that American preponderance 
in the realm of material resources, coupled with the “obvious” moral 
rectitude of its global policy preferences, naturally confers upon the 
U.S. the mantle of leadership. Finally, I will demonstrate how all of 
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these errors converge to suggest a program of U.N. “reform” that is 
largely beside the point, at least if one is truly interested in renewing 
American hegemony. I conclude by arguing that what is needed now 
is not so much U.N. reform but “hegemonic reform”—that is, reform 
of the way in which the U.S. practices leadership in the international 
domain. To be sure, there are ways of tweaking the structures and 
practices of the U.N. that would make it (marginally) more effective 
and legitimate. Ultimately, however, the legitimacy and stability of the 
current U.S.-centered world order is a function of American leader-
ship. Enlightened multilateralism has the capacity to breathe new life 
into the existing U.N., making the need for root-and-branch reform 
unnecessary. Predatory unilateralism, on the other hand, will cripple 
the U.N., no matter what formal, technical, or political reforms are 
introduced.
II. Neoconservatives, Hegemonic Renewal, and the U.N.
At one level, Gardiner’s project is the renewal of the United Nations 
Organization. His goal, he argues, is to suggest a set of reforms that 
will restore the confidence of both the United States government and 
the American people in an institution that is failing to deliver on the 
promises of its founding charter. At a deeper level, however, Gardin-
er’s project is actually part of the broader neoconservative project to 
renew American leadership in the global political economy. At the 
risk of eliding important differences of emphasis among its various 
adherents, neoconservative geopolitical discourse comprises the fol-
lowing defining elements. First, neoconservatives understand the 
existing world order to be dominated by states. While they accept the 
existence of non-state and institutional actors (international organiza-
tions, NGOs, etc.), they see these as relatively marginal epiphenomena 
of the state-system (the only partial exception would be global terror 
networks, such as Al-Qaida, and even these are viewed as dependent 
upon state sponsors). Second, neoconservatives understand power 
to be a function of wealth and military force. For them, influence in 
international affairs is directly related to the possession of material 
resources, such as weapons and money. Third, understood in this way, 
the U.S. currently enjoys an overwhelming preponderance of power, 
which necessarily confers upon it the mantle of global leadership. 
Fourth, the current era is thus “unipolar” in nature. In other words, 
it is one in which the U.S. lacks a serious “peer competitor” and thus 
Macalester International  Vol. 19
72
enjoys the status of being the “sole superpower” in the global geo-
political system. Deriving directly from this concept is the view that 
now is a moment of unprecedented opportunity to remake the world 
in America’s image by exporting the blessings of the American way of 
life, rewriting the rules of global order, and securing America’s current 
military, economic, and cultural pre-eminence. Finally, the neoconser-
vatives see the unipolar moment as one of new dangers (terrorism, 
rogue states armed with WMDs, etc.) that must be met decisively with 
all the tools (military, diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement, and 
so on) available to the U.S. and its allies. Although perhaps tempered 
by recent experiences in Iraq, neoconservatives see the use of coercive 
threats backed by credible military force as a primary instrument of 
American statecraft.
Gardiner’s particular contribution to the neoconservative literature 
is that he provides a clear articulation of the ways in which adherents 
to this geopolitical school of thought (a) understand the United Nations 
and (b) believe it should be reformed. With respect to the former, the 
text clearly conveys the palpable sense of disdain-bordering-on-disgust 
that most neoconservatives harbor toward the United Nations. Beyond 
that, it also articulates the view that the U.N. is ultimately nothing 
more than a nuisance verging on becoming an irrelevance. For most neo-
conservatives, the U.N. is either an irrelevance in that it aspires to little 
more than “realpolitik by committee” (and is therefore congenitally 
defective) or a nuisance in that it is the site at which the world’s Lillipu-
tians sometimes successfully forge politico-diplomatic bonds that they 
then attempt to use to restrain the American Gulliver. Thus, as part 
and parcel of the project of American hegemonic renewal, they tend 
to advocate abolishing or withdrawing from the U.N., or taming it by 
making it more reflective of, and responsive to, U.S. values and inter-
ests. Gardiner has clearly synthesized these two positions, arguing that 
the U.N. is, in fact, a bothersome nuisance sliding quickly toward irrel-
evance. For him, the “solution” (always framed against the backdrop 
of the underlying project—the revitalization of American leadership) 
is to impose a package of reforms in the realms of accountability and 
transparency, peacekeeping, and human rights. These might not save 
it from irrelevance, but would surely make it less of a nuisance to a 
United States seeking to impose its own values on, and pursue its own 
interests in, the world.
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III. Conceptual Errors: 
An Immanent Critique of the Neoconservative Strategy
In assessing this project, it is useful to employ the Hegelian method of 
“immanent critique”—that is, to subject it to criticism on its own terms 
in order to highlight its internal inconsistencies and logical errors. 
Accordingly, I take as my point of departure the same premise as the 
neoconservatives: that the unipolar moment is propitious for reassert-
ing and revitalizing American leadership in the world. I then proceed 
to demonstrate how a number of ultimately debilitating conceptual 
errors prevent neoconservative thinkers from understanding what this 
would truly entail, leading them instead to adopt a strategic vision that 
is directly responsible, inter alia, for the series of tragic blunders that is 
the Bush Administration’s Iraq policy.
A. The Naïve Concept of Power
Simply put, neoconservatives like Gardiner share an erroneous under-
standing of “power” that is possessive, material, and subjective in 
nature. It is possessive in that it rests on the premise that a state can 
possess a quantifiable commodity of power simply by virtue of con-
trolling certain resources. It is material because it equates the posses-
sion of tangible resources, such a guns and money, with the ability to 
influence outcomes and realize objectives. Finally, it is subjective in that 
it ignores the social (or intersubjective) nature of power, at least in the 
sense of an ability to bring about desired outcomes in a multi-actor 
setting. In short, although neoconservatives sometimes talk about the 
“soft power” putatively generated by American culture and its “uni-
versal” values, they understand real power almost exclusively in coer-
cive terms. In other words, they see power as the threat or use of force 
(whether military, diplomatic, or economic) to compel others to behave 
in a particular way.
While capturing something salient (coercion, after all, can have an 
important role to play in politics), this is a profoundly naïve under-
standing of power in that it ignores the social, intersubjective dimen-
sion of all human phenomena, and, perhaps more importantly, because 
it attempts to wish away the inconvenient need to negotiate with and 
accommodate others if one is to govern effectively. Somewhat more 
specifically, there are three fatal flaws with this conceptualization of 
power. First, it confuses the possession of material resources with influ-
Macalester International  Vol. 19
74
ence and the ability to induce others to act in accordance with one’s 
wishes. While there is a relationship between resources and power, 
there is no direct correlation. The first simply does not confer the sec-
ond. Military power, for example, is not always convertible into influ-
ence across the full range of issues that comprise contemporary global 
politics. Second, even as a means of inducing certain forms of behav-
ior, coercion and force produce only temporary, unstable, and costly 
forms of influence, a reality attested to by thinkers like Edmund Burke 
and Niccolo Machiavelli, who have been appropriated by the politi-
cal right, as well as leftist thinkers like Antonio Gramsci. It effectively 
ignores the nonmaterial forms of power that flow directly from the 
social context of all human political relationships. Pace Mao Zedong 
and others of his ilk, power does not, in fact, flow from the barrel of a 
gun. At best, then, this form of power can produce domination; it cannot 
deliver hegemony, properly understood as involving consent as well as 
coercion.
B. A Tragically Flawed Understanding of “Hegemony”
Dr. Gardiner and other neoconservatives understand leadership or 
hegemony as a function of the preceding definition of power: pre-
ponderant power equals preponderant influence (which is by defini-
tion leadership). In this view, the unipolar moment is by necessity a 
moment of U.S. leadership because it is when the U.S. can exercise 
sufficient coercive power to establish the rules of the game that it feels 
best suit its needs, values, and interests. Obviously, to the extent that 
it is predicated on the naïve notion of power articulated above, this 
view of leadership is similarly flawed. Indeed, the failure to grasp the 
basic nature of political power seems to have led neoconservatives 
like Gardiner to conflate two quite different concepts: domination and 
hegemony. Since the neoconservatives came to power in 2000, this has 
had tragic consequences for America’s position in the world.
As the writings of Antonio Gramsci, Robert Cox, and others make 
very clear, however, hegemony is not simply domination. It is a form 
of rule grounded in the legitimacy that accrues to a leader when (and 
only when) that leader pursues legitimate ends (goals that are widely 
accepted as providing benefits to both the hegemon and a substantial 
portion of the subordinate actors); legitimate means (methods that are 
consistent with generally agreed rules and widely subscribed institu-
tional practices); and negotiated rule change (changes in procedural 
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and substantive norms that are at least endorsed by those subject to 
these norms). In other words, hegemony is a form of governance based 
perhaps implicitly on coercion, but in a more immediate and quotidian 
sense based on the consent of the governed. Unlike domination, which 
is always costly and unstable, history teaches us that hegemony tends 
to be both stable and efficient, if always (and uncomfortably for some) 
messy in the political sense of requiring negotiation, compromise, and 
accommodation.
IV. Concluding Remarks
Ultimately, these errors converge within neoconservative thought to 
produce a deep disdain for the United Nations. But just as the underly-
ing conceptual premises are deeply flawed, so too are the inferences 
that many neoconservative thinkers draw from them. While it may be 
suffering from neglect, the United Nations is neither irrelevant nor a 
nuisance. Rather, it is the principal entity that legitimizes the existing 
U.S.-based global order. Simply put, it is an indispensable element of 
American hegemony. Consequently, any attempt to revitalize Ameri-
can hegemony will require two steps.
To begin with, it will require reforms of the U.N. that will enhance 
its legitimacy. If hegemony requires consent—and if consent requires 
legitimate ends, legitimate means, and negotiated rule change—then 
the U.N. is necessary to U.S. hegemony in several ways: it confers legit-
imacy on specific actions (such as approval of policies as being con-
sistent with global norms); it modulates U.S. policy so that it becomes 
more legitimate (that is, it “tweaks” hegemonic policies so that they 
become more consistent with global norms); and it legitimizes rules 
and norms that are consistent with America’s long-term interests. Sig-
nificantly, while other international organizations are important ele-
ments of the U.S.-based global order, the United Nations is unique 
in that it is the only universal organization that deals with issues of 
international peace and security. Put simply, if the U.N. did not exist, 
Washington would probably have to create something very much like 
it. All this being the case, I suggest that America’s interests would ulti-
mately be best served by two sets of changes to the U.N. that would 
enhance its legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. First, 
in broad-brush terms, the Security Council needs to be reformed so 
that its membership becomes more reflective of both the actual distri-
bution of power and the major regions or civilizations comprising the 
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global community. Second (and here I agree with Gardiner), sustained 
efforts need to be made to address the problems of waste, incompe-
tence, and corruption within the organization. Whatever the details, 
however, the key ingredient is that these reforms will have to be nego-
tiated in good faith (no more threats of exit if Washington does not get 
its way). Carried out properly, in a manner consistent with the prin-
ciples of power and hegemony outlined above, reforms such as these 
have the potential of enhancing the legitimacy of both the U.N. and the 
United States.
Beyond reforming the U.N., the revitalization of U.S. hegemony 
(the avowed goal of Gardiner and the neoconservatives) will require 
the reform of U.S. policy toward the multilateral order in general and 
the U.N. is particular. Put directly, and contrary to the prescriptions of 
Gardiner and the neoconservatives, the revival of American hegemony 
must involve the adoption of an international posture that is far more 
constructively multilateral than has been the case since the neoconser-
vatives assumed power. The U.S., for example, needs to adopt a grand 
strategy that emphasizes (a) the collective framing of rules and laws to 
govern global political life as well as a willingness to subordinate U.S. 
interests to those laws; (b) the creation of robust multilateral institu-
tions (to regularize power and help with coordination and coopera-
tion); (c) the provision of certain “public goods” (maintaining the basic 
rules of the system, promoting cosmopolitan goods such as human 
rights, etc.); and (d) the impartial application of “justice” (including 
a reasonable degree of global distributive justice; justice for victims 
of historical processes such as forced migration, colonial oppression, 
etc.). Such policies would re-establish the legitimacy of American lead-
ership far more effectively than the unilateral, and at times highly 
militaristic, policies espoused by the neoconservatives. Absent such a 
strategic shift, it is hard to imagine that any changes in the form, com-
position, or practices of the U.N. would have any significant impact 
at all on either the contemporary world order or American leadership 
within that order.
